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The following is a report by Third
World Network researcher Yin Shao Loong about the fourth
preparatory committee meeting for the WSSD.
THE BATTLE OF BALI:
Last stop before the World Summit on Sustainable
Development
By Yin Shao Loong
Third World Network
June 2002
Negotiations on an action plan for the forthcoming
UN summit on sustainable development have ended in deadlock as key
developed nations hold back from commitments on finance, debt relief
and combating poverty.
The Bali preparatory meeting for the World
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), to be held in August 2002
in Johannesburg, South Africa, saw a clear North-South divide emerge
over reform of international relations.
Tense closed-door negotiations took place
over the last 24 hours of the Bali PrepCom, which ended in the early
hours of 8 June. Ministers and senior officials of the US, EU, Japan,
Mexico, Norway and the developing-country negotiating bloc known
as the Group of 77 and China, which comprises 137 countries, met
on the morning of Friday 7 June to consider a draft paper detailing
a proposal for the financing of a sustainable development action
plan for the 21st century (Agenda 21 of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit).
Negotiations had crawled for some days over
the content and financial resources covered by the “Means of Implementation”
section of the WSSD’s plan of action, which PrepCom chairman and
former Indonesian environment minister Emil Salim had hoped to dub
the “Bali Commitment” if negotiations had been successful.
The text negotiated thus far is being transmitted
to Johannesburg, 73% has been agreed and the rest - largely pertaining
to trade, finance and globalisation - remains contentious and in
brackets as per UN negotiations indicating unagreed text. This threatens
to be a setback to the Summit’s prospects for success since many
developed countries have been aiming to undermine progress on both
environment and development issues since Rio.
Negotiations in Bali had proceeded on four
tracks: the environment and natural resources (including energy,
water, biodiversity and special programmes for small-island developing
states (SIDS) and Africa); the institutional framework for sustainable
development (focusing on the modalities and reform of global, regional
and national governance institutions); trade and finance (including
in the Means of Implementation); and tentative negotiations on a
political declaration for the Johannesburg Summit.
By the last day of the Bali PrepCom, apart
from the Means of Implementation, negotiations had stopped unfinished
on all tracks with over 200 brackets outstanding. Among them was
the Rio Principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”
of nations to sustainable development. That mention of this principle
within the preamble was highlighted as an outstanding issue by the
US testifies to the incredible backslide on the sustainable development
agenda since 1992.
After the Rio Earth Summit the UN had calculated
that Agenda 21’s implementation would cost over $600 billion annually
in developing countries. Developed countries had agreed to commit
$125 billion a year through official development assistance (ODA),
a figure based upon 0.7% of their gross national product (GNP).
To date, only five countries have met this target - Denmark, Finland,
the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. And since 1992, 14 of 21 donor
countries have seen their aid budgets decline.
Developing countries were keen to move beyond
the level of the March 2002 Monterrey Conference on Financing for
Development which had only reaffirmed developed countries’ commitment
to meet the Rio target of 0.7% of GNP as ODA. The EU committed as
a whole to an average of 0.33% of GNP as ODA. The US announced an
increase of $5 billion over 2004-2006 above its present level. Japanese
ODA, however, is expected to continue its downward slide.
Efforts to put substantial debt relief for the most indebted countries
on the table at Monterrey had largely failed, in part due, as some
countries had complained, to premature concessions by the G77 and
China, chaired this year by Venezuela.
However, developed countries have been adamant
throughout the last three WSSD PrepCom meetings that the Means of
Implementation should not go beyond agreements made at Monterrey
or at the last World Trade Organisation (WTO) meeting in Doha, Qatar.
The US and Japan in particular have been reluctant to concede any
progressive terms that would link unsustainable levels of debt with
sustainable development despite the common linkage of poverty. The
EU has been more conciliatory, a position due in no small part to
the fact that most of developing-country debt to the EU is public
debt, in contrast to the predominantly private debt held by the
US and Japan.
According to Binnie Bichauri of INFID (an
NGO debt network), Indonesia whose biggest creditor is Japan, pays
$45 per citizen per day in debt whilst each citizen receives $2
per day in health care and education.
During an evening meeting of ministers of
the EU and G77/China on Thursday 6 June the EU issued a non-paper
version of the Means of Implementation (which would only become
an official paper following consensual adoption). This was later
amalgamated with a G77 and China position in the early hours of
Friday. South African minister for environment and tourism
Valli Moosa presented the new draft to the select group of six ministers
at 08:00. The non-paper received ministerial approval for consideration
by delegations.
The G77 and China convened at 11:00 to consider
the paper. According to observers, Venezuelan chairman Vicente
Vallenilla presented it as a “take it or leave it” option, which
caused some debate in G77 and China ranks. India voiced objections
to positions on ODA within the paper. Samoa defended the work put
into the paper, overseen by fellow SIDS-member John Ashe of Antigua
and Barbuda, who had chaired the Means of Implementation negotiations.
Some African countries, which already had a special section within
the plan of action for Africa, were focused on garnering more financial
concessions, and attempted to sound out a US representative on climate
change funds during the course of the meeting. Brazil suggested
that plan of action texts negotiated thus far be taken to Johannesburg
and negotiated as a package rather than isolate the Means of Implementation
section. China voiced what was to become the interim position: wait
and see what the other countries make of the non-paper.
The US and Japanese delegations clustered
in the corridors around John Ashe outlining their contentions. Although
they did not proceed far beyond the first half of the paper it was
clear that they were both not in favour of progressive language
on debt relief. All in all, 13 points of disagreement were registered.
The EU’s principal objection was reference
to market access for developing countries and phasing out all forms
of export subsidies, and substantial reductions in trade-distorting
domestic support under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. Europe’s
provision of agricultural subsidies to its farmers remains a non-negotiable
issue in international fora. (It is notable that, apart from the
host Italy and Spain, who holds the EU presidency, no developed
country heads of states chose to attend the FAO World Food Summit
on 10-13 June, where market access for developing countries was
hotly debated.)
Norway, which had been frozen out of closed-door
negotiations earlier during the week, voiced dissatisfaction with
the process. It stated its intention to submit a formal letter of
complaint over its exclusion. Norway had been consistent in making
a number of usually constructive interventions in the institutional
framework and Means of Implementation negotiations. However, a call
of complaint by Washington to the Norwegian ambassador in the US
reportedly engendered a more subdued approach by the delegation
in Bali.
Within a day the locus of the PrepCom and
the fate of the Bali Commitment had shifted from the negotiating
rooms to the corridors and the small meeting rooms of the PrepCom
Bureau.
The six key delegations re-gathered in the
Bandung Room of the Bali International Conference Centre to hear
their respective positions. Chairman Emil Salim, eager for a deal
to be struck, declared that the paper was a “take it or leave it”
document and reminded delegations present that his mandate expired
after 7 June. The G77 and China took a bold step and declared that
they found the paper acceptable and if other delegations were unable
to accept it then the last week of negotiations on finance would
be rendered void and parties would have to revert to the last officially
published working text.
This was a calculated gamble on the part
of the G77 and China to test the political will of the developed
countries. The 08:00 non-paper contained much language favoured
by the developed countries which prejudiced the outcomes of the
present work programme at the WTO by listing targets for the completion
of negotiations on new issues. It also contained moderate language
on the international financial architecture which did not contain
any proposals for reform. The key tests of political will lay within
paragraphs on debt (which attempted to advance beyond the Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief initiative), diversification
for commodity-dependent countries, and the elimination of agricultural
subsidies. Additionally both the US and EU had advanced similar
text on the WTO-TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights) agreement and public health, implying that implementation
of TRIPS would be a boon for public health whereas in fact TRIPS,
by enshrining strict intellectual property rights, raises the costs
for public health care (witness the feud in South Africa and elsewhere
over access to HIV/AIDS drugs). The 08:00 non-paper reversed the
emphasis stressing the suspension clauses within TRIPS which parties
may exercise as they deem fit as part of a public health approach
rather than TRIPS itself.
If the developed countries rejected the
paper it would be clear that they were against substantive debt
forgiveness, sustainable commodity-based economies, fair terms of
trade and public health in developing countries. In spite of high
talk by developed nations of combating poverty, ensuring sustainable
consumption and protecting human rights and the environment, it
would be clear, if the compromise package was rejected, that on
matters of substance the North wanted the South to stay locked into
its subordinate position within the global economy. There would
be no sustainable development without commitment to its implementation.
Least developed countries cannot be expected to make inroads into
sustainable resource use if they face crushing debts, falling commodity
prices and an HIV/AIDS pandemic for which they are unable to purchase
medicines or fund policies. The UN Conference on Trade and
Development’s (UNCTAD) Trade and Development Report 2002 has observed
that developing countries are trading more whilst earning less.
Meanwhile prices of goods in the North are falling. The South is
on the losing side of this equation.
The EU stated that it could accept the non-paper
as the basis for further negotiation. Norway, Mexico and New Zealand
also accepted the paper. The US and Japan stayed silent throughout.
Raising the pressure, the G77 and China declared that the Bandung
Room was divided by an invisible curtain: on one side stood the
EU, US and Japan, on the other side stood the rest of the world.
They stated again that they wanted a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to the
non-paper, or else the Means of Implementation would fall back to
the previous deadlock of the week before.
Norway later struck for a compromise position
by supporting the EU approach. A key US negotiator was seen
disappearing into the bushes whilst presumably on the phone with
Washington which had just woken up. The evening plenary was indefinitely
postponed.
At around midnight the plenary was convened
but the news was already out in the corridors: no deal. There would
be no Bali Commitment and chairman Emil Salim’s exhausted face said
it all. The UN bureaucracy had made a clear impression in conversations
and informal consultations throughout the two weeks of the PrepCom
that achieving a deal was at times more important than the substance.
Had it not been for the unexpectedly bold strategy of the G77 and
China in the final hours of the PrepCom, it would be likely that
Johannesburg would contribute little more to international politics
than a half-hearted endorsement of the need to make development
sustainable, an effort to be achieved by the weak concept of voluntary
partnerships as vehicles for implementation, complementary to the
official plan of action.
The controversial partnership concept is
a direct index of the declining ability of increasing parts of the
UN to boldly address the institutional and systemic inequalities
at the heart of the international economic order.
This is what emerged in the final hours
of the Battle of Bali: a politics for Johannesburg.
In a movement which in many ways reprised
Rio it was again made clear that sustainable development was not
simply an issue of environment or even poverty, but fundamentally
one of equity within the world order. There has been a dramatic
re-militarisation of the globe since 11 September and this is directly
bound to the punishing economic conditions imposed for decades on
developing countries, conditions under which sustainable development
(or even development) is not possible.
In her closing address to the plenary, Venezuelan
Minister for Environment Ana Elisa Osorio, speaking for the G77
and China, stated that despite efforts made and flexibility shown
by the G77 and China, unity amongst major parties was not achieved.
She emphasised the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities
and financial mechanisms necessary to implement sustainable development,
including the burden of external debt and developing-country products
not finding access to markets at remunerative prices.
If there is a search for a political focus
around the Johannesburg Summit, a focus which has up to now been
dramatically absent (evidenced by the public musings of many to
forego the Summit), then parties could do little better than to
focus on fundamental crisis issues such as debt, fair and stable
commodity prices and basic development needs. From these stem inroads
to resolving the environmental, health, poverty and gender macro-crises.
The US, Japan and to an extent the EU have shown that when push
comes to shove they are unwilling to commit to progress in these
areas. This makes Johannesburg a Summit not just about sustainable
development, but about the conditions necessary for a decent life
itself.
Yin Shao Loong is a researcher with Third
World Network.
Contact: twnkl@po.jaring.my
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