Copenbloggin: IFG at
the UN Climate Conference in Copenhagen, Denmark
IFG's Blog - Direct from Copenhagen
Blog Entries
Reports from IFG Board and Associates attending the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Jan 4, 2010: "Obama’s “Copenhagen
Accord” – UNFCCC turns to WTO?"
Dec 22, 2009: "Personal
Perspectives: Returning from Copenhagen"
Dec 21, 2009: "Climate: Talks end by only "noting" an
Accord after much wrangling"
Dec 20, 2009: "California has keen interest in Copenhagen"
Dec 17, 2009: "US Technology Innovators’ 'Call
to Action' for
Cooperation in Copenhagen"
Dec 17, 2009: "Martin Khor, IFG board member,
discussed what Copenhagen needed to deliver from a climate justice
perspective"
Dec 16, 2009: IFG Press Conference at COP 15 with Victor Menotti
and Claire Greensfelder
Dec 15, 2009: "Tech Transfer Stymied
by Lack of Climate Funding from Rich"

Jan
4, 2010:
Obama’s “Copenhagen Accord” – UNFCCC turns
to WTO?
from Victor Menotti (top
of the
page)
President Obama’s proposed “Copenhagen Accord” aims
to shift from developed to developing countries the balance of “common
but differentiated responsibilities” that have been bedrock
principles of equity in the United Nations’ Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), reaffirmed in the 2007 Bali Action Plan’s
carefully constructed negotiating mandate for the Copenhagen conference.
If agreed, it would—in addition to enshrining scientifically
unsound emission reductions and promising entirely inadequate finance
for poor countries—establish new obligations on developing
countries. The result could be the removal of the linchpin on a raft
of new responsibilities on developing countries’ policies at
a time when the US itself has yet to enact any of its own obligations
assumed almost two decades ago.
One indication of the new obligations to be imposed on developing
countries is the mere amount of text: almost three times more detailing
specific obligations for developing than developed countries.
In addition, President Obama explained in his Bella Center press
event that:
“The way this agreement is structured, each nation will be
putting concrete commitments into an appendix to the document, and
so will lay out very specifically what each country's intentions
are. Those commitments will then be subject to a international consultation
and analysis, similar to, for example, what takes place when the
WTO is examining progress or lack of progress that countries are
making on various commitments…So that's why I say that this
is going to be a first step…this is going to be the first
time in which even voluntarily they offered up mitigation targets.
And I think that it was important to essentially get that shift in
orientation moving, that's what I think will end up being most significant
about this accord.”*
Essential to what would be new for Non-Annex
I Parties to the Convention are that “Mitigation actions taken by Non-Annex I parties will
be subject to their domestic measurement, reporting, and verification
the result of which will be reported through the national communications
every two years…with provisions for international consultations
and analyses” (President Obama underscored this last phrase
four times in his brief remarks).
The WTO counterpart to this proposed UNFCCC process
would of course be the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, which is
sort of a policy police for each countries’ trade measures and practices. International
reviews with determine if countries policies are in compliance with
world trade rules. While the current proposed Copenhagen Accord does
not go that far it may extend to similar disciplines eventually.
Earlier drafts said that, “A consultative process, the Periodic
Forum, is hereby established which will compromise all parties convening
regularly to consider the climate policy and practices of parties.
The consultative process shall be based on the report of the national
authority which will include its national inventory.”
Obama’s UNFCCC move must be seen in the context of the same
power dynamics in play at the World Trade Organization, where developed
countries promised to reduce export subsidies and increase market
access upon WTO’s establishment of a legally binding deal in
1994. But 15 years after developing countries opened up their farming
sectors to subsidized imports from developed countries (that undercut
small farmers in developing countries and threaten food security),
the United States still has not implemented its commitments, even
after losing to developing countries several WTO legal challenges.
Now, as a precondition for concluding the current Doha round of world
trade talks, developed countries are demanding that developing countries “pay
twice” by opening their markets even more in exchange for implementing
what was already agreed before.
Resolving the global climate crisis means the world must move from
a competitive to a cooperative style of international relations,
where President Obama lives up to his prize-winning multilateralism
and United States pro-actively builds trust with developing countries.
Let this begin in Copenhagen.
*[REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT, Office of the Press Secretary, THE WHITE
HOUSE Bella Center, Copenhagen, Denmark, December 18, 2009, 10:30
P.M. CET]
(Read
Victor Menotti's article at the FNTG website)

Dec
22 2009: Personal Perspectives: Returning from Copenhagen
from Alexis Halbert, Climate Technology Program Coordinator (top
of the
page)
Arriving in Copenhagen for the climate negotiations was a singular
and extraordinary experience. There was a seed of optimism buried
deeply in my belly - it was as if the opportunity itself, the final
convening of the nations of the world after years of work could redirect
the global course; if not through cooperation then out of the sheer
willingness and intention of those whose were aware of what was at
stake. The cold streets of Copenhagen would soon be filled with tens
of thousands of people from around the world voicing the support
of civil society for courageous action. Tall pillar candles in the
windows lining the streets illuminated a deeper, secret hope for
change; the light cut gently and knowingly through the winter darkness.
* * *
I had worked hard the previous six months with
my director at the International Forum on Globalization, pulling
apart the pieces of the negotiating text to determine the key issues
related to international technology transfer. We twice convened
Bay Area clean technology stakeholders to discuss role of the US
in the new green economy and how as innovators we could meet our
international obligations of providing access to low carbon technologies
and know-how for ‘developing’ world
countries to adapt to climate change and mitigate future greenhouse
gas emissions. While all eyes at home were on the Congress and the
process of passing national climate policy, we knew that without
an ambitious offering in finance and technology on the international
stage by the US, there would be no global deal and the chances of
averting catastrophic climate change would be greatly diminished.
As the first week in the Bella Center commenced,
it became clear that two irreconcilable paradigms dominated the
talks. The issue of governance and the balance of power between
national, international, and market mechanisms was at the center
of this divide: Would the United Nations, where countries ideally
have an equal say in the process and decision making ultimately
be the body that governed or oversaw the implementation of the
agreed solutions? To what degree would the world rely on markets
to solve the impending climate catastrophe? Did a loose framework
of individual national actions really amount to ‘enhanced’ action
in the face of climate change? And to what degree would existing
international institutions, whose mandates many countries held
responsible for their economic and societal hardships, be in control
of the funding or have decision-making power? The gap between seeing
the world as one big unlimited market where economic competitiveness
is the most important factor, and the view of the world as a generous
home that provides for all our needs, but is falling apart due
to being treated like a commodity, is vast. To this extent failure
in Copenhagen was inevitable - how do you negotiate across this
gap?
Despite signing the Bali Action Plan, where the United States agreed
to actions comparable to those of its developed country counterparts
in the Kyoto Protocol, the very framework and ground rules of the
climate negotiations were called into question due to fears of how
the essential emission reductions in developed countries would effect
their global economic competitiveness compared to emerging economies
such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa. These fears also prompted
the developed nations to bypass the previous agreements on developing
country actions, insisting that they take on similar requirements
on binding emission reductions and reporting requirements as their
rich country counterparts.
Although civil society groups watched the divide between nations
grow each day, we still pushed forward working to bridge the gaps.
I made my home at the Bella Center for the duration of the talks
and for twelve hours a day, gathered intelligence from colleagues
on the status of the closed door technology meetings and searched
for new clues and leverage points for the IFG technology statement
that was crafted by our local stakeholder group and endorsed by US
businesses. Our aim was to shift the discussion, lending support
to the US negotiators to make more cooperative and bold decisions.
The statement supported the call for an international mechanism under
the authority of the Conference of Parties that would function to
coordinate technology transfer, stimulating research, development,
assessment, dissemination and the leveraging of public moneys to
commercialize and provide access to essential technologies in the
developing world while supporting the growth of our capacities at
home in the US. We successfully delivered our statement to US negotiators
and began the process of educating domestic constituencies on the
importance of international actions, the necessity of supporting
our own capacity to meet the call for a low carbon economy, and the
role of the United Nations in an international climate change regime.
The importance of civil society participation
in the climate process cannot be underestimated. The news reports
on ‘protester’ activity
is a sad and reductionist viewpoint of one of the most essential
aspects of the climate negotiating process. The civil society leadership
that was present in the Bella Center was as equally talented, educated,
and eloquent as the elected governmental representation - and was
consistently looked to for guidance and information by many delegations
from around the world. The voice of the people most concerned about
and most effected by climate change was represented by the many civil
society groups that were accredited participants of the UN process
- which was why many protested the revoking of passes from the Bella
Center and the lack of transparency and democracy in the process
that was the result.
Despite the many sleepless nights at the end
of the two-week meeting by both civil society participants and
delegates in the Bella Center, or the “bella of the beast” as Amy Goodman from Democracy
Now! called it, the talks ended desperately with only a shallow document ‘noting’ areas
of agreement. The failure to bring home a fair, ambitious and binding
climate agreement is truly calamitous - and the even greater concern
is the lack of urgency and real ambition by the United States and
our developed country allies. The ubiquitous excuse for a lack
of cooperative action in Copenhagen ultimately led back to the lack
of political will in the United States to pass climate legislation.
The shadow of the failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in the US
and a potential of repeat performance on a new binding accord was
the kiss of death in Copenhagen. I fear that the fate of nations,
the lives of hundreds of millions of people, will be sacrificed to
the grip of the fossil fuel industry and Wall Street, and to the
ignorance of a few ‘leaders’ who are still unable to
comprehend the impending climate catastrophe.
Now that the negotiations have ended the blame
game has begun, with China coming out on top despite developed
country failures to place either the cumulative 40% carbon dioxide
reduction targets by 2020 on the table and a lack of the needed
finance to help developing countries adapt to a problem that they
did not create. While China recently replaced the United States
as the largest current greenhouse gas emitter (despite have having
four times the population, and one-fifth the emissions per capita
of the US), by many accounts the recent commitments by the Chinese
(who are a part of the 130+ nations that make up the ‘developing’ country
G77 block) have surpassed both their international obligations
and comparable actions by the US.
The reality of the climate situation and the
scale at which we need to mobilize and deviate from ‘business as usual’ is
almost incomprehensible. While the solutions strike the very foundation
of our industrial capitalist society, they also offer an exciting
and innovative view of our future on this planet. To say that we
are in a global emergency is an understatement, but also to say that
we lack the ambition and resources to transform this crisis is not
only a failure of imagination, but is an outright lie.
* * *
Flying back home to San Francisco, the mountains softly undulated
beneath the broad forested expanse of the northeastern US. The horizon
was marked by a patchwork of snowy bare clear-cuts and roads for
as far as the eye could see. There was not one place visible out
my window that had not been impacted by human activity.
We are strangely invisible to ourselves - the
broad-scale industrial expansion and consumption that has divided
and conquered the very natural systems that we so graciously depend
on for life is still a mystery to many. But global climate change,
the culmination of this vast endeavor to ‘develop’,
is neither undetectable nor silent. The cries of entire nations
are now audible. The task we face of awaking to the consequences
of our actions, especially in industrial nations, is immense. The
commitment to change and to find the solutions we need to transform
our societies to low carbon communities is revolutionary and it
is our future.
Despite the failure to come to agreement, the seed of possibility
that I arrived with in Copenhagen is already sprouting and is fed
by the hundreds of thousands of determined people who will never
stop working for climate solutions. It is watered by each act that
feeds our collective hunger for justice and the recognition that
we are all in this together. I want to thank the International Forum
on Globalization for the incredible opportunity to participate in
the negotiations, and I look forward to continuing this important
work.

Dec
21 2009: "Climate: Talks end by only "noting" an Accord after much wrangling"
from Martin Khor (top of
the
page)
Download
Martin Khor's entire article (PDF)
The Copenhagen Climate Conference
ended in disarray because a secretive meeting of leaders of 26 countries
held within the conference centre and convened by the Danish Presidency
of the conference was seen as undemocratic by many developing countries,
and the Copenhagen Accord arising from that meeting was thus only "noted" and
not adopted.
The decision of the conference to take note of the Accord saved
the conference from complete failure. In the media, there was ambiguity
over what had happened, with initial statements from US President
Barrack Obama and UK Premier Gordon Brown being reported as if a
successful conference deal had been adopted. Such statements even
before the text of the Accord had been shown to the members of the
Conference of Parties of the Convention infuriated many delegates,
and became the subject of criticism during the meeting.
Even after the "takes note" decision was adopted, the
UN Secretary General in a statement to the plenary meeting he stated "you
sealed the deal, now you must turn words into deeds" and at
a press conference he also repeated that a deal had been sealed.
This added to the general confusion.
Most confusing of all was the way Danish Premier
Lars Rasmussen handled the Conference as a whole and its final
plenary, which he chaired. There were many twists and turns and
contradictions in the rulings that he made, especially his repeated
overturning of decisions and conclusions that he had conducted
over or made himself. In the end, the conference participants did
not adopt the Accord that arose from the "super green room" but made a decision to merely "take
note" of it. In the language of the UN, "taking note" gives
a low or neutral status to the document being referred to. It means
that the document is not approved by the meeting (in which case the
word "adopts" would be used). "Taking note" also
does not connote whether the document is seen in a positive light
(in which case the word "welcomes" would be used) or negatively
(in which case "rejects" or "disapproves of" would
be used).
Thus there is no obligation, legal or political, for a member of
the Convention as such to implement the Accord.
Many other questions, however arise, such as
the extent to which the participants of the 26-country meeting
are bound by the Accord. Some delegates pointed out, outside the
conference room, that their agreement on the Accord was on the
assumption that it would eventually be adopted by all Convention
members. Following the adoption of the decision to simply "take note" of the document, more hours
were spent on how to interpret the "takes note" decision,
with many of the developed countries trying to stretch its meaning.
The intention of some of them seemed to be to convert the Accord
into some kind of plurilateral agreement, which countries can sign
on to, and with developing countries that take on the commitments
being able eligible to get funding. The entire situation, legally
and politically, remained murky and became more so during the conference
and immediately following the end of the conference. Even the
question of which forum adopted the "takes note" decision
is an issue, because the decision was taken in the meeting of parties
of the Kyoto Protocol, of which the US is not a member), whereas
the Decision states that the Conference of Parties (COP) took note
of the Accord. Moreover the Kyoto Protocol has no jurisdiction over
most of the key points in the Accord, which falls under the mandate
of the Convention and its COP.
The events of the dramatic last two days of the Conference will
be debated for years to come, and what is already the subject of
interpretation by diplomats and policy makers and politicians will
soon be the rich subject of lawyers' interpretations. Some delegates
of developing countries were also already looking ahead and considering
the task of picking up the pieces and get the global talks going
again next year, as there is much at stake. Little noticed in the
final sessions was the passage of the reports of the Chairs of the
two ad hoc working groups, on Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) and long-term
cooperative action (AWG-LCA). These are the working groups within
which the UNFCCC members have been discussing and negotiating the
range of climate change issues, for two years in the case of the
AWG-LCA and four years in the case of the AWG-KP.
At Copenhagen itself, most of the delegations were involved in intense
negotiations, often well past midnight, in drafting groups on such
issues as mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, shared vision
(in the AWG-LCA) and on the numbers for emission reduction, rules
for accounting for LULUCF (land use and forest), and market-based
mechanisms (in the AWG-KP). They were attempting to come to as much
consensus as possible on texts on these issues, which together would
form the basis of Decisions covering the Bali Action Plan (in the
case of the AWG-LCA) and amendments to the Kyoto Protocol (in the
AWG-KP).
The delegates in this bottom-up approach were seriously concerned
that their work, in the multilateral, inclusive and open-ended fora,
would be undermined by the most important of their topics being discussed
in an exclusive group of political leaders, working on a text provided
by the Danish Presidency, which only a few would have access to.
Even as the Danish Presidency assured the Conference
of Parties and delegates several times that there would be no Danish
text and no secret meetings, the ground was prepared for the group
of 26 leaders to meet. News of their meeting was scarce, and by
the last day (18 December) various versions of drafts coming out
of the "room
upstairs" were leaked out, with NGOs sharing the texts with
delegates and vice versa, and utter confusion as to which drafts
were early of later versions.
Throughout the leaders' meeting that started
on 17 December and went on to the evening of 18 December, there
was non-confirmation that it was taking place, let alone which
countries had been invited and what text they were discussing.
It was only later, and through media reports, that the delegates
found out that the 26-leaders' talks had been on the verge of breaking
down altogether, and that President Obama had barged into a room
where the leaders of China, India, Brazil and South Africa were
meeting, and over an intense period that they had thrashed out
the wording for the text on contentious issues, particularly whether
and how the "verification" of
developing countries' mitigation actions would be undertaken.
It was somehow assumed by some of the leading members of the 26-country
group that once they had reached agreement among themselves that
the Conference of Parties with its over 190 members would endorse
it. After all, the small group comprised the top leaders of the most
powerful countries, including the US, Russia, Japan, Germany, the
UK, France, China, India, Brazil, South Africa, and others such as
Ethiopia, Grenada, Saudi Arabia. Up till today, the Danish government
has not released the list of participants.
So confident was Obama, or so ignorant of UN
procedures, that he gave a press conference to US journalists (which
was broadcast to the conference centre) that a deal had been done,
and how he viewed it. This incensed some of the developing countries'
delegates who had not been officially told about the 26-leaders'
meeting nor shown any text of the "Copenhagen Accord." Indeed,
even some of the 26 leaders had not seen the final draft of the
text, according to a developing country official who participated
in the meeting.
When the full membership of the Conference or
Parties was summoned to the closing plenary session to hear about
the Accord for the first time (and they were kept waiting five
hours until 3 a.m. on the morning of Saturday 19 December), the
top-down 26-leaders "non-meeting" finally
blended with the bottom-up membership of the Conference of Parties,
with explosive results. And this is where the Conference foundered
in its last hours on the issue of international democracy and global
governance. The question was: Can a "deal" patched up by
leaders of 26 countries in a secretive meeting that was not supposed
to be happening be simply presented to 193 countries to adopt without
changes in the dying hours of what is claimed to be the most important
international conference ever held? The answer came in the early
hours of Saturday morning, after many hours of high drama in the
Conference hall, and it was No.
When Danish Prime Minister Lars Rasmussen, who
presided over the Conference's final days, convened the final plenary
session at 3 a.m. on 19 December, he for the first time officially
announced that a meeting had been taking place of leaders of 26
countries (whose names he did not give) and that a Copenhagen Accord
had been drawn up for the Conference to adopt. As he tried to leave
the podium after suspending the meeting for an hour, an attempt
was made by a delegate to open the discussion on a point of order.
When told of this by the Conference secretariat, Rasmussen was
heard through the microphone to say "No point of order." But before he could stride
off the stage, he was stopped by Venezuelan delegate Claudia Caldera
who used her plastic card to loudly bang on the table, for almost
a minute. "After keeping us waiting for hours, after several
leaders from developed countries have told the media an agreement
has been reached when we haven't even been given a text, you throw
the paper on the table and try to leave the room," she said.
This behaviour is against United Nations practice
and the UN Charter itself, she said. "Until you tell us where the text has come
from, and we hold consultations on it, we should not suspend this
session. Even if we have to cut our hand and draw blood to make you
allow us to speak, we will do so," she added, referring to how
she had banged on the table in her effort to get the attention of
Rasmussen before he left the podium.
Ian Fry, representing Tuvalu, a small island
state that will be among the first islands to disappear as a result
of climate change, told Rasmussen he had pressed the button on
a point of order before the Prime Minister gaveled. "We are
working under the UN, and it is good to see Mr Ban Ki Moon in the
podium. We are given respect under the UN, whether big or small
countries, and matters are decided collectively in the Conference
of Parties.
"But I saw on TV that a leader of a developed country said
he had a deal. This is disrespectful of the UN." He said
negotiations by media may be a norm in some countries but we want
a process for the consideration of the document and that time is
given for this. Fry said a cursory review showed many problems with
the Accord, mentioning several points. Noting that some money had
also been mentioned in the document, he said: "We are offered
30 pieces of silver to betray our people and our future. Our future
is not for sale. Tuvalu cannot accept this document."
Bolivia said it was offended by the methodology
which is disrespectful, that a document is imposed on a majority
of countries that have not had the chance to study it. "You put it that representative
leaders of the world were consulted. But countries not consulted
are not represented. Why have we not discussed this document before
and why are we given 60 minutes to look at this document now which
will decide the lives of our people.
"This document does not respect two years of work (discussions
that have produced draft texts in working groups) and our people's
rights are not respected, so we cannot endorse this document which
is by a small group that think they can take the opportunity to impose
on us." Costa Rica said that reasons we have heard, this document
cannot be considered the work of the AWG-LCA and cannot be considered
for adoption. It can only be an information document (known as INF).
Nicaragua, represented by Presidential Advisor Paul Oquist, declared
that the UN's democratic system had seen a deterioration here, with
a President convening a meeting of 26 countries while neglecting
the G192 (referring to the 192 members of the UN). He said a number
of countries had just now written to the UN Secretary General expressing
deep sorrow that the Copenhagen Conference has not followed the UN's
principles of transparency, inclusiveness and equality among states,
by the Presidency holding a meeting limited to a small number of
chosen parties. "We cannot respect an agreement made by a few
countries. The only agreements we respect are those made through
an open process and adopted by consensus." He proposed that
the Conference be suspended, that the mandates of the working groups
be extended, and that talks resume next year for a final conclusion
in June. He also read out the text of two formal proposals from ALBA
countries for having resumed sessions of the COP and the Kyoto Protocol's
meeting of Parties in June.
Rasmussen then referred to Costa Rica's proposal to make the Copenhagen
Accord an INF document that would indicate the proponent Parties
and asked if Nicaragua would accept this and change its proposal
to suspend this session. Nicaragua responded that the Accord could
be a MISC document as a submission of certain Parties. It would then
withdraw its proposed Decisions and would accept the other two Decisions
by the President to extend the work of the two working groups under
the same mandate to finish their work at the next COP and Meeting
of Parties of the KP. (See separate article on the Decisions taken).
Following this, the Chair then said the working groups would extend
their mandates, the Copenhagen Accord would be a MISC document and
we don't suspend the conference. India said that with regard to the
proposal to re-issue the Accord as a submission by countries, the
Chair should first get the assent of the countries before issuing
the document on their behalf. Rasmussen said this was not a problem
and India was correct. Could Nicaragua withdraw its proposal (with
these conditions)? Nicaragua then stated its group could agreed to
withdraw its proposal.
Sudan, represented by Ambassador Lumumba Di-Aping,
said the document was one of the most disturbing developments in
the history of UNFCCC. It threatens the lives and livelihoods of
millions of Africans. He said the Chair has advanced with a "circle of commitment" to
agree to accept a solution based on 2 degrees that would condemn
Africa into a furnace as it would result in a 3 or 5 degree temperature
rise in Africa, citing IPCC reports. The pact would be a suicide
pact to maintain the economic dominance of a few countries, is devoid
of morality and based on values that got 6 million in Europe into
furnaces. It is immoral for such a document to be issued by a UN
related body and the promise of funds should not bribe us to destroy
the continent. He asked for the document to be withdrawn. He
criticized Rasmussen for conducting his duties as President in a
biased way, violating the all rules of transparency.
Several countries, including Canada, Sweden, UK and Norway expressed
strong disapproval and in some cases disgust of what they considered
to be Sudan's reference to the holocaust. Some developing countries
also disapproved of the strong language used by Sudan. Several developed
countries spoke up to defend the work that had been done by the political
leaders in the small group, which should be respected instead of
vilified, and urged that the Copenhagen Accord be adopted. This was
also the position of several developing countries, including the
Maldives and Ethiopia. Notably, China and India -- the developing
countries that were the most active in the small meeting -- did not
speak to urge others to adopt the Accord.
When it became clear there was no consensus to
adopt the document, some developed countries, led by the United
Kingdom and Slovenia, proposed a vote be taken, or else that it
be adopted with the names of dissenting countries placed in a footnote.
These "adoption
by non-consensus" views were rejected by others who pointed
out that it was against the rules of procedure. Eventually a compromise
was reached to take note of the Accord.
During the debate, the President of Maldives commended the Danish
Prime Minister and said science suggests we have a 7 year window
to act before reaching tipping points. The talks were not taking
us to conclusions in two years. If these talks went on we would have
lost the opportunity. The President selected a group to come up with
a document, which is a beginning and allows us to continue the negotiations
in 2010. He appealed to not let the talks collapse and to back the
document. Egypt said that to accept it as a MISC document, the countries
that had been consulted and are morally bound by it had to be inserted.
Some developed countries, such as Spain, Australia
and France said they were astonished or even "wounded" by
how delegates at this meeting were portraying and belittling those
who took part in the 26-country meeting The efforts were to help
those who are vulnerable to climate change. The people who need
help will be frustrated again. Sweden supported Maldives and said
the Accord is a compromise for the way forward. Norway said there
was no progress in the talks for one week and then the leaders
came and made an unprecedented effort. Russia said the document
should be adopted.
Ethiopia speaking for the African Union said the document is a compromise
and it supported the document. Senegal supported Ethiopia but regret
certain points in the document, saying it did not want to see the
funeral of the Kyoto Protocol and we need a 1.5 degree target. Gabon
endorsed the view that the document was made in good faith and it
was not good to make insulting remarks. The Philippines also endorsed
the document.
Grenada, speaking for AOSIS, and whose Prime Minister attended the
small meeting, said it stands for the document and the process although
it respected the credible opposition and those who have differences
with the process but it was against an offensive portrayal of the
work of its government, and asked for emotions to be controlled.
UK Climate Minister Ed Miliband said this institution faces a profound
crisis, and has a choice of supporting a document produced in good
faith with fast start funds and a $100 billion funding (in 2020)
and ensuring responsibilities on mitigation, or to refer to the holocaust
and wrecking the conference. He said passing the document as information
is inadequate and urged it to be adopted.
Rasmussen then asked who is against adopting the document, remarking
that only four countries are opposing it. Venezuela stated that the
procedures do not allow for a vote, and that it won't accept a document
from a process that violates UN principles. Rasmussen then apologized
for counting the people against the document and urged every single
country to sign up to it. Cuba told the President he was confusing
the procedure. There is no consensus to adopt this document. There
had been hypocritical statements, with European countries offering
money here to get this document. This is shameful and we should not
go for a path with no solution. Rasmussen then said Cuba was absolutely
right, there is no consensus and we cannot adopt this draft.
Slovenia then suggested the paper be adopted with a footnote listing
the countries against it. Todd Stern of the US said that it was disappointing
to see the work by the leaders not recognized. Listing the elements
of the Accord such as targets to be taken by developed countries,
listing of mitigation actions by developing countries, a compromise
on transparency, contributions to the fund, decision on technology
mechanism, all of this we will walk away from, and it is disturbing
for the existence of this body. He supported the UK proposal to adopt
the document. Bolivia made criticisms of the Accord, including the
non commitment to emission reduction, the 2 degree target and the
inadequate funds. It said Bolivia had its own strong positions but
did not come up with a document without consulting the members, and
this is the issue. There had been a non democratic process. It urged
members to respect the work in the working groups and get back to
the groups to move forward. Venezuela said only 25 of 192 members
took part in the meeting and only 14 developing countries were involved,
and the Parties did not give a mandate to the Presidency (to hold
the small meeting). The Accord does not give any figures for Annex
I emission cuts.
Sudan traced the developments of the past two weeks and said that
when delegates in the AWG-KP and AWG-LCA tried to make progress on
its work, many issues were taken out of our hands. The finance proposals
in the Accord are proposals of the developed countries, and do not
reflect the concrete proposals of the G77 and China especially on
governance. It denies historical responsibility and shifts the burden
to developing countries. The negotiations were taken out of our hands
and we only have the proposals of developed countries. It proposed
a renewal of the AWG-LCA mandate and continue the work there in a
party-driven manner.
Saudi Arabia said this was the worst plenary where nothing went
right. It was part of the small group and associated with the Accord
but it was against suggestions such as voting and asking Parties
to sign on to documents, which break the rules on how we do things.
The simple reality is there is no consensus on the document and this
is a body that decides on consensus. The UK reiterated its request
to adopt the document and note those that are against it.
Rasmussen then asked for reactions to this UK
proposal. Nicaragua replied that the least we can hope for is for
the Presidency to be consistent and to carry forward the working
groups as already agreed. "We
don't agree to change the agreement reached tonight."
Saudi Arabia said we operate by rules and under
these rules you cannot put up a proposal for consensus and then
put reservations in it. This is not how this body operates and
we are not going to change it now. Bolivia said that a few hours
ago a compromise was reached, that allows the work to continue.
No delegation opposed it then. The ALBA countries agreed to withdraw
their proposed Decisions while the Accord becomes a MISC document.
It recalled the conclusions that Rasmussen read out and on that
basis we withdrew our proposed Decisions. We have a commitment
you made, let us not overturn this decision. After the above wrangling,
lasting hours, a break was called for consultations during which
a compromise was reached, in which a Decision was adopted in which
the Conference of Parties "takes
note of the Copenhagen Accord of 18 December 2009." The Accord,
with the names of countries that took part in the small meeting,
would be attached to the Decision. In the language of the UN, "taking
note" gives a low or neutral status to the document being referred
to. It means that the document is not approved by the meeting and
it does not imply whether the document is seen in a positive or negative
light.
Following the adoption of the decision to simply "take note" of
the document, more hours were spent on how to interpret the "takes
note" decision, with the developed countries trying to stretch
its meaning. The United States, supported by a number of other developed
countries tried to interpret the decision as allowing for a "opt
in" type of arrangement, with countries notifying their intention
to join. They tried to garner support for expanding the "takes
note" decision into a system that seems styled after a plurilateral
agreement, and linked it to the finance issue in an attempt to get
support from developing countries.
Ed Miliband, the UK's Climate Minister, was blunt
about linking the funding of developing countries with accepting
the Accord. Those which support the Accord have to register this
support. The concerns he raised must be duly noted "otherwise
we won't operationalise the funds."
The US wanted an arrangement through which Parties
can associate with the Accord. It said there are funds in the Accord,
and "it
is open to any Party that is interested." This implies that
Parties that do not register their endorsement of the Accord would
not be eligible for funding. This attempted linkage of finance to
the acceptance of the Accord is of course not in line with the rules
of the Climate Convention, in which the which the developed countries
have committed themselves to provide developing countries with the
funds needed for them to take climate related actions. Funding the
actions of developing countries does not require that a new agreement
or an Accord be established.
The actual Copenhagen Accord itself is only three pages in length.
What is left out is probably more important than what it contains.
The Accord does not mention any figures of the emission reduction
that the developed countries are to undertake after 2012, either
as an aggregate target or as individual country targets. This failure
at attaining reduction commitments is the biggest failure of the
document and of the whole Conference.
It marks the failure of leadership of the developed countries, which
are responsible for most of the Greenhouse Gases retained in the
atmosphere, to commit to an ambitious emissions target. While the
developing countries have demanded that the aggregate target should
be over 40% reduction by 2020 compared to 1990 levels, the national
pledges to date by developed countries amount to only 13-19 per cent
in aggregate. Perhaps this very low ambition level is the reason
that the Accord remains silent on this issue, except to state to
give a deadline of 31 January 2010 for countries to provide their
targets. It is hard to believe that this deadline will be met, since
there has been so much foot-dragging on this in the three four years.
Another omission was the lack of assurance that the Kyoto Protocol
would continue, with developed countries taking on emission reduction
commitments in a second period starting 2013. The continuation of
Kyoto was a top priority demand of the G77 and China, while the developed
countries have announced their intention to set up a new agreement
altogether, which the developing countries fear will not have the
strict disciplines of Kyoto.
The Accord recognizes the broad scientific view
that global temperature increase should be below 2 degrees Celsius,
and agrees to enhance cooperative action, on the basis of equity.
This echoes the view recently affirmed by India that accepting
a target of temperature limit, whether it be 2 or 1.5 degrees,
has to come with a burden-sharing framework, with equity as its
basis. The Accord states the collective commitment of developed
countries to provide new and additional funds of US$30 billion
in 2010-2012 through international institutions. It
is unclear how new the funds will be, since the developed countries
have already committed to contribute billions of dollars to the World
Bank's climate investment funds.
It also states the developed countries will jointly
mobilize US$100 billion a year by 2020 for developing countries.
This is weak as the commitment is for "mobilising" funds and not a guarantee
or pledge of actual funds. The actual quantum is also doubtful since
the Accord also says that the sources of the funds will include public
and private sectors, bilateral and multilateral and alternative sources.
The US$100 billion is not said to be "new and additional",
so it may include existing funds or already planned funds.
The Accord also contains a lengthy paragraph on the mitigation actions
by developing countries, and how these should be measured, reported
on and verified (MRV). This was reportedly a heated topic at the
small heads-of-state meeting, with US President Obama pressing the
developing countries, particularly China, to undertake more MRV obligations.
The Accord is a thin document, containing hardly any new commitments
by developed countries, with a weak global goal, and attempts to
get developing countries to do more.
It is a sad reflection of the Copenhagen Conference
that this thin document is being held up as its main achievement.
Even then it was only "noted" and not adopted by the
UNFCCC's membership.
But in fact most of the work in the two-week
stay in Copenhagen was carried out in the two working groups, on
long-term action and on the Kyoto Protocol. There was some
progress made in the long-term action group while the Kyoto Protocol
group has hardly made any progress.
The two working groups will resume work next year and the hope is
that they will finish their work by June or December 2010. + Climate:
Attempts to make Copenhagen Accord a plurilateral agreement
Copenhagen, 21 Dec (Meena Raman) -- At the final
hours of the Copenhagen climate conference, after taking the decision
to "take note" of
the Copenhagen Accord, high drama and intense exchanges continued
among Parties as developed countries attempted to stretch the meaning
of "taking note" into forming some kind of a plurilateral
agreement among Parties who had agreed to the Accord. The President
of the Conference of Parties read out the decision on the Accord.
He said that the "COP at its 15th session takes note of the
Copenhagen Accord of 18 Dec 2009." The names of the Parties
having agreed to the Accord is to be stated in the Accord.
This decision was mired in controversy as developed
countries wanted the COP to facilitate the Accord's implementation
under Article 7.2( c) of the Convention. Confusion ran high as
to which forum had adopted the decision (i.e. whether it was in
the setting of the COP under the Convention or the meeting of Parties
under the Kyoto Protocol [CMP]). The decision to "take-note of" was
made at the CMP when the decision was read as having been adopted
at the COP.
This "administrative error" had to be subsequently corrected.
As to whether the Accord was to be noted in the two tracks of the
COP and the CMP was also unclear, with the secretariat expressing
one view and Parties raising concerns on the other. The whole way
in which the decision was handled and adopted by the COP President
clearly reflected a mishandling of established procedures. In pushing
for the Accord, US's special climate envoy Todd Stern said that interested
Parties and members will be informed about the Accord they can associate
themselves with it. He said that it was important for Parties to
have an opportunity to associate with the Accord. At this point,
South Africa wanted a clarification as to where the decision about
the Accord was made and wanted to confirm that the setting where
the decision was taken was a COP setting. The Secretariat clarified
that while the proposal (regarding the Accord) was read during the
meeting of the CMP (and not the COP), the text of the decision (on "taking
note") refers to the COP. It said that its understanding is
that the decision would apply to both the tracks under the Convention
and the Kyoto Protocol. Bolivia stressed that the COP had taken note
of the Accord and that it had not been adopted. The countries that
want to associate with it will have a process, as the US has suggested.
The list of the Parties in a chapeau is the chapeau of the Accord,
not the chapeau of the COP decision, said Bolivia, indicating that
the Accord was outside the COP process.
Saudi Arabia said that while it was part of the
26 countries that met regarding the Accord, since there is no consensus
among Parties, the Accord is already outside the process of the
COP. The COP did not decide to adopt the Accord. Saudi Arabia did
not want to start a precedent here. "We cannot have countries to open a list (for
signing). Whatever is done should not be part of our formal process.
We need to respect the process. We should not go beyond what was
done outside the UNFCCC. This is not acceptable even though we were
part of that small drafting group. So we should take it as it is
and we are strongly opposed to any further step to make it more formal
than it is. We just took note of it (the Accord)," said Saudi
Arabia.
Pakistan said that it has joined the consensus to take note of the
Accord, although it had concerns about the process. It said that
it had no role in the process. One of the principles derived from
the UN is transparency. There has been an absence of transparency.
This is not what the UN stands for and is not what we are here for,
said Pakistan. Parties are here to reach an agreed outcome and not
to cut deals. Such processes do not help but widen the chasms. Efforts
were made in good faith but that does not necessarily mean good results.
It said that the Accord should not be used as a precedent in future
discussions, as there were several questions regarding it and there
was no time for regional discussions.
China, referring to the clarification by the
Secretariat, said that in reading out the decision (regarding the
Accord), there was reference to the CMP. The Secretariat had clarified
that the note (regarding the "take note" of the Accord) would apply in the two tracks
(of the COP and the CMP). China said that it was hesitant to take
that view. China said that it was not sure about "taking note" of
the same Accord twice. "If the CMP is to take note of the Accord,
we will take note of that when we come to it (the CMP meeting)," it
said.
The two appendices (in the Accord which refer
to quantified economy-wide emission targets for 2020 and nationally
appropriate mitigation actions of developing countries separately)
will cause problems especially in the CMP as it would be a way
to bring new commitments and obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.
(The KP does not impose mitigation obligations on developing countries).
China stressed the need to be aware of the connotations and implications
of this. China also expressed its concern about the follow-up procedure
in relation to the Accord. The Accord was something that was "taken-note" of.
It is not a treaty to be signed or agreed to.
Venezuela stressed that Parties had agreed to take note of the Accord,
notwithstanding the fact that the document did not enjoy consensus.
That was an expression of extreme flexibility on its part, it said.
It urged Parties to respect what was agreed to (in taking note of
the Accord) and not use further ploys to soil the decision agreed
to.
The United States said that five countries out of 192 were in favour
of the Accord. It was a decision of the COP (to take note of the
Accord). This kind of understanding is explicitly provided for under
Article 7.2 ( c) of the Convention. (The US referred to Article 7.2
( c) to suggest that the COP can facilitate, at the request of two
or more Parties, the coordination of measures adopted by them to
address climate change and its effects, taking into account the differing
circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties and
their respective commitments under the Convention).
The US said that all Parties can associate with
the Accord and expected many
Parties to do so and was open to any COP Party. It hoped to have
a "robust group". Australia, Norway, Sweden (for the EU),
Japan and Canada echoed the suggestion by the US to request the COP
to facilitate measures to implement the Copenhagen Accord.
Saudi Arabia once again said that although it took part in the Accord,
it would not want the Accord to be a precedent as Parties must work
on the basis of unanimity which must be approved by all. If there
is a single expression of disagreement, it will not be possible to
arrive at an agreement under the COP. To take note of does not mean
that the document is part of a decision of the COP. The Accord is
not binding on Parties. A Party is free to decide what it wishes
to do with it.
Grenada, speaking for AOSIS, said that rightly or wrongly, Parties
went ahead with the Accord. Its expectation was for the Accord to
deliver and looked to its rapid implementation of the Accord. Senegal
wanted to accede to the Accord and said that there should be a mechanism
on modalities for accession. It asked the Secretariat to clarify
matters. Indonesia also asked for clarification on the 26 countries
who were part of the Accord. Bangladesh also asked for the Accord
to be facilitated by the secretariat.
South Africa said that there had been a procedural and administrative
mistake. A COP decision was adopted in a wrong setting (at the CMP).
There is need to correct the record on what was adopted formally.
It elaborated on what was needed. South Africa said that there was
confusion around language adopted as read from the podium and gave
rise to different interpretations. There was need to view the record
to provide the exact language. It said there was need for a correction
with a footnote as a legal opinion on what a decision means as there
was extreme confusion, as if it was some sort of binding treaty.
It was a decision to note the Accord. It was a process outside the
UNFCCC process and does not mean that in noting (of the Accord) there
is any binding nature, said South Africa. On the US question as to
how Parties are to associate with the Accord, South Africa said that
it could be done under the report of the COP. Parties can submit
their intent to be associated.
The Secretariat once again read out what the
decision was, i.e. that "the COP takes note of the Copenhagen Accord of 18 December
2009." To this decision, would be attached the Accord. In this
Accord, the chapeau would be modified to include the list of Parties
who associate with the Accord, said the Secretariat. On how Parties
can associate with the Accord, the Secretariat said that there were
two suggestions: (1) as a communication from the Presidency, and
(2) a recording in a list of the Parties. It said that the onus was
on the Parties to communicate the association to the Accord. On the
suggestion by several Parties regarding Article 7.2 ( c) of the Convention
for the COP to coordinate measures among Parties, the Secretariat
said that proposals had to be made more formally in writing. On the
forum where the decision to take note of the Accord was adopted,
the Secretariat said that the record would be corrected so that the
decision in the CMP earlier is deemed to have been adopted under
the COP, as the wording of the decision did indicate that it was
the COP that was taking note of the Accord. South Africa also said
that there were Parties who had participated in the discussions in
developing the Accord, while there may be a separate list for Parties
who may wish to associate with it. The Secretariat said that it was
not in receipt officially of Parties who participated in the Accord
and suggested that the process be one of self-designation.
Cuba underlined that the Accord was not a protocol and is not legally
binding. It was more like a declaration like the MDGs or the Paris
Declaration. It does not say that those who wish to associate with
it can follow a procedure. Tanzania said that it was not very clear
as to what was adopted. It sought clarification on the link of the
Accord to the extended mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term
Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA). It asked if the Accord could merge
with what is in the AWG-LCA.
China said that there was need to be clear on a number of issues.
It was not sure of the legal implications of something which was
negotiated but not adopted, and which was just proposed by the President
of the COP. Parties can express their views and can have follow up
activities. If they wish to associate themselves with the Accord,
it was up to each Party. There was no need for a formal procedure.
It would be up to each Party to communicate to the Secretariat or
by other means that they have participated in discussions. The Accord
has not been endorsed as it was developed by a small group of Parties.
On the idea of a footnote, it said that it should not be part of
the decision to take note but rather as a report of the COP. In reference
to Article 7.2( c), China did not think that it could apply to the
Accord. Australia did not agree with China and said that the article
could be used.
Bolivia said that since the Accord was outside
the UNFCCC process, it had no formal identity and Article 7.2(
c) should not apply. It did not see how the implementation of the
Accord could be supported. Saudi Arabia said that if Parties wanted
Article 7.2( c) to be applied, this must be initiated by Parties
and there must be an agenda item for it to be discussed. It said
that many Parties who were part of the drafting of the Accord may
now wish to join the Accord as there is no consensus. The Accord
should have no further life, it said. Iran said that to the best
of its recollection, to "take note
of" has no negative or positive implication.
India said that the listing of Parties of the
Accord was not part of the COP decision. Russia said that "take note" means
we recognize the existence of the Accord without taking an opinion
on it. It said maybe it could be put on the UNFCCC website. The US
said that the Accord was codified and it was surprised by comments
by Parties, as the Accord say "Parties have agreed". It
will associate with the Accord which is in the context of political
agreement. It is happy to have a list of the Parties who are associated
with it. Ethiopia, speaking for the African Union, said that it supported
the Accord. The Solomon Islands said that it did not have any opportunity
to study the Accord and its implications. "We have put our lives
into the hands of 26 countries," it said. The issue was not
just about finance but about survival. It said that there is need
to talk about environmental refugees and their relocation. Papua
New Guinea said that the Accord is not perfect but it is a quick
start and begins to build architecture. + Climate: Working groups
to continue work and present results next year Copenhagen, 21 Dec
(Meena Raman) -- Parties at the Copenhagen climate meetings have
requested the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action
under the Convention (AWG-LCA) and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further
Commitments for Annex 1 Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP)
to continue their work and present results by the next meeting of
the Conference of Parties (COP) and meeting of Parties under the
Kyoto Protocol (CMP) in 2010. The sixteenth meeting of the COP and
the sixth meeting of the CMP is scheduled for 29 November to 10 December
2010, and is to be held in Mexico.
The Copenhagen COP adopted the decision to extend the mandate of
the AWG-LCA to enable it to continue its work with a view to presenting
the outcome of its work to the Conference of the Parties for adoption
at its sixteenth session. It also requested the AWG-LCA to continue
its work drawing on the report of the AWG-LCA presented to the COP
at its fifteenth session, as well as work undertaken by the COP on
the basis of that report.
As regards the AWG-KP, in order to ensure that there is no gap between
the first and second commitment periods of the Kyoto Protocol and
recognizing that Annex I Parties should continue to take the lead
in combating climate change, the CMP requested the AWG-KP's work
on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol
to deliver the results of its work for adoption by the CMP at its
sixth session. It also requested the AWG-KP to continue its work
drawing on the draft text forwarded as part of its report during
the Copenhagen meeting of the CMP.
Trade: Panel set over Chinese measures on export of raw materials
Geneva, 21 Dec (Kanaga Raja) -- The WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)
on Monday agreed to establish a single panel to rule on measures
imposed by China related to the exportation of various raw materials.
Three panel requests were made in respect of this dispute, namely,
from the United States, the European Communities and Mexico.
This was a second-time request and panel establishment was automatic.
Argentina, Colombia, Korea, Canada, Brazil, Ecuador, Japan, Turkey,
India, Chile, Norway and Chinese Taipei reserved their third-party
rights to the dispute;so did the US, Mexico, and the European Union
in the disputes raised by the other two.
The dispute is with respect to China's restraints
on the exportation from China of various forms of bauxite, coke,
fluorspar, magnesium, manganese, silicon carbide, silicon metal,
yellow phosphorus, and zinc (referred to as the "materials" in
the compliant).
The complaints argued that China subjects the exportation of bauxite,
coke, fluorspar, silicon carbide, and zinc to quantitative restrictions
such as quotas. They also said that China subjects the materials
to export duties. In addition to the export quotas and export duties,
China imposes other restraints on the exportation of the materials,
administers its measures in a manner that is not uniform, impartial,
and reasonable, imposes excessive fees and formalities on exportation,
and does not publish certain measures pertaining to requirements,
restrictions, or prohibitions on exports, said the complainants.
In a statement at the DSB, the US reiterated that it is concerned
about Chinese measures that restrain the exportation of certain raw
materials that are critical to US manufacturing industries. These
restraints not only limit the availability of these raw materials,
but also increase the cost of these raw materials to the US and other
producers outside of China, while providing an artificial cost advantage
to downstream industries within China.
The European Union said that the Chinese export restraints on raw
materials are by no means a recent phenomenon. The restraints were
a problem at the time of China's accession to the WTO and they remain
so today. In expressing disappointment at the requests for panel
establishment, China said that such action is not conducive to the
solution of this matter. It voiced certain concerns with the way
in which the three complainants have framed their panel requests.
It said that it will seek a preliminary ruling on the consistency
of the requests with Article 6.2 In other actions, under the surveillance
agenda item in relation to the regime for the importation, sale and
distribution of bananas, second recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU
by Ecuador, the European Union in its status report said that it
was glad to report that it has reached a historical agreement with
Latin American banana suppliers last week.
It said that these agreements provide for final settlement of all
current disputes regarding the EU import regime for bananas upon
certification of a new EU tariff schedule on bananas. It added that
it has now started internal procedures for the authorization of the
signature and provisional application of the agreement, pending the
conclusion of ratification procedures.
The Chair of the DSB said that this item will be kept on the agenda
and will be dealt with at the next meeting of the DSB.
Meanwhile, under other business, Brazil informed the DSB that, on
the basis of complete data related to fiscal year 2008 and calendar
year 2008, obtained from the United States and other sources indicated
by the Arbitrator, the total amount of counter-measures authorized
to Brazil would be $829.3 million. On the basis of the same period,
the threshold above which Brazil is entitled to take counter-measures
in other sectors and agreements outside trade in goods would be $561
million.

Dec
20 2009: "California has keen interest in Copenhagen"
from Rob Collier (top
of the
page)
Read
Rob Collier's article at the SF Chronicle website

Dec
17 2009: US Technology Innovators’ "Call to Action"
for Cooperation in Copenhagen
(top
of the
page)
Download
and read the two page call to action (pdf)

Dec
17 2009: Martin Khor, IFG board member, discussed what Copenhagen
needed to deliver from a climate justice perspective
(top of the
page)

IFG Board Member, Martin Khor (far right), of the South Centre,
explains climate change's impacts on developing countries at
a press conference with (from left to right) Pan-African Climate
Justice Alliance's Mithika Mwenda; Third World Network's Lin
Li Lim; African Group leader/Algerian Ambassador Kamel Djemoual;
and former lead coordinator and negotiator for the G77 and
China in Copenhagen Bernarditas de Castro Muller. |
|
|

Dec
16 2009: IFG Press Conference at COP 15
with Victor Menotti and Claire Greensfelder
(top
of the
page)
Download COP15 Press Event Press Release (pdf)

Dec
15 2009: "Tech Transfer Stymied by Lack of Climate Funding
from Rich"
from Victor Menotti (top
of the
page)
Reporters never get it all right but here's a link
to a rare piece in a climate blog. |