Walden Bello
Distinguished Visiting Professor of International Development
Studies St. Mary’s University, Halifax, Canada; Professor
of Sociology at the University of the Philippines (Diliman); Senior
analyst & former executive director of Focus on the Global
South, Bangkok, Thailand.
Presentation at the International Forum on Globalization Teach-In:
Confronting the Global Triple
Crisis: Climate Change, Peak
Oil, Global Resource Depletion
Washington,
D.C. • September 14 – 16, 2007
1 The assistance of my colleagues Afsar Jafri
and DaleWen in the preparation
of this article is gratefully acknowledged. They are not, however,
responsible for any possible errors of fact or interpretation.
The developing world’s stance towards the question of the
environment has often been equated with the pugnacious comments
of former Malaysian Prime Minister Mohamad Mahathir, such as his
famous lines at the Rio Conference on the Environment and Development
in June 1992:
When the rich chopped down their own forests, built their poison-belching
factories and scoured the
world for cheap resources,
the poor said nothing. Indeed they paid for the development of
the rich. Now the rich claim a right to regulate the development
of the poor countries…As colonies
we were exploited. Now as
independent nations we are to be equally exploited.1
Mahathir has been interpreted in the North as speaking for a South
that seeks to catch up whatever the cost and where the environmental
movement is weak or non-existent. Today, China is seen as the prime
exemplar of this Mahathirian obsession with rapid industrialization
with minimal regard for the environment.
This view of the South’s perspective on the environment
is a caricature. In fact, the environmental costs of rapid industrialization
are of major concern to significant sectors of the population of
developing countries and, in many of them, the environmental movement
has been a significant actor. Moreover, there is currently an active
discussion in many countries of alternatives to the destabilizing
high-growth model. In the following talk, I focus on the environmental
movement in Asia. However, many of the same trends can be observed
in Latin America, Africa, and other parts of the global South.
Emergence of the Environmental Movement in the NICs
Among
the most advanced environmental
movements are those in Korea
and Taiwan, which were once
known as “Newly Industrializing
Countries” (NICs).
This should not be surprising
since the process of rapid
industrialization in these two societies from 1965 to 1990 took
place with few environmental controls, if any. In Korea, the Han
River that flows through Seoul and the Nakdong River flowing through
Pusan were so polluted by unchecked dumping of industrial waste
that they were close to being classified as biologically dead.
Toxic waste dumping reached critical proportions. Seoul achieved
the distinction in 1978 of being the city with the highest content
of sulphuric dioxide in the air, with high levels being registered
as well in Inchon, Pusan, Ulsan, Masan, Anyang, and Changweon.2
In Taiwan, high-speed industrialization had its own particular
hellish contours. Taiwan’s formula for balanced growth was
to prevent industrial concentration
and encourage manufacturers to set up shop in the countryside.
The result was a substantial number of the island’s 90,000
hectares locating on rice fields, along waterways, and beside residences.
With three factories per square mile, Taiwan’s rate of industrial
density was 75 times that of the US. One result was that 20 per
cent of farm land was polluted by industrial waste water and 30
per cent of rice grown on the island was contaminated with heavy
metals, including mercury, arsenic, and cadmium.3
In both societies, farmers, workers, and the environment bore
the costs of high-speed industrialization. Both societies, it is
not surprising, saw the emergence of an environmental movement
that was spontaneous, that drew participants from different classes,
that saw environmental demands linked with issues of employment,
occupational health, and agricultural crisis, and that was quite
militant. Direct action became a weapon of choice because, as Michael
Hsiao pointed out:
People have learned that protesting can bring results; most
of the actions for which we could find out the results had achieved
their objectives. The polluting
factories were either forced to make immediate improvement of
the conditions or pay compensation to the victims. Some factories
were even forced to shut down or move to another location. A
few preventive actions have even succeeded in forcing prospective
plants to withdraw from their planned construction.4
The environmental movements in both societies were able to force
government to come out with restrictive new rules on toxics, industrial
waste, and air pollution. Ironically, however, these successful
cases of citizen action created a new problem, which was the migration
of polluting industries from Taiwan and Korea to China and Southeast
Asia. Along with Japanese firms, Korean and Taiwanese enterprises
went to Southeast Asia and China mainly for two reasons: cheap
labor and lax environmental laws.
Environmental Struggles in Southeast Asia
Unlike in Korea and
Taiwan, environmental movements
already existed in a number of the Southeast Asian countries before
the period of rapid industrialization, which in their case occurred
in the mid-eighties to the mid-nineties. These movements had emerged
in the seventies and eighties in struggles against nuclear power,
as in the Philippines; against big hydroelectric dams, as in Thailand,
Indonesia, and the Philippines; and against deforestation and marine
pollution, as in Thailand and the Philippines. These were epic
battles, like the struggle against the Chico River Dam in the northern
Philippines and the fight against the Pak Mun Dam in the northeast
of Thailand, which forced the World Bank to withdraw its planned
support for giant hydroelectric projects, an outcome that, as we
shall see later on, also occurred in struggle against the Narmada
Dam in India. The fight against industrial associated partly with
foreign firms seeking to escape strict environmental regulations
at home was a case of a new front being opened up in an ongoing
struggle to save the environment.
Perhaps even more than in Northeast Asia, the environmental question
in Southeast Asia was an issue that involved the masses and went
beyond being a middle-class issue. In the Chico struggle, the opposition
were indigenous people, while in the fight against the Pak Mun
Dam, it was small farmers and fisherfolk. The environmental issue
was also more coherently integrated into an overarching critique.
In the case of the Philippines, for instance, deforestation was
seen as an inevitable consequence of a strategy of export-oriented
growth imposed by World Bank-International Monetary Fund structural
adjustment programs that sought to pay off the country’s
massive foreign debt with the dollars gained from exporting the
country’s timber and other natural resources and manufactures
produced by cheap labor. The middle class, workers, the urban poor,
and environmentalists were thrust into a natural alliance. Meantime,
transnational capital, local monopoly capital, and the central
government were cast in the role of being an anti-environmental
axis.
The environmental movements in Southeast Asia played a vital role
not only in scuttling projects
like the Bataan nuclear plant but in ousting the dictatorships
that reigned there in the seventies and eighties. Indeed, because
the environment was not perceived by authoritarian regimes as “political,” organizing
around environmental and public
health issues was not initially proscribed. Thus environmental
struggles became an issue around which the anti-dictatorship movement
could organize and reach new people. Environmental destruction
became one more graphic example of a regime’s irresponsibility.
In Indonesia, for example, the environmental organization WALHI
went so far as to file a lawsuit for pollution and environmental
destruction against six government bodies, including the Minister
of the Environment and Population5. By the time the dictatorships
wised up to what was happening, it was often too late: environmentalism
and anti-fascism fed on one another.
The environmental movement is at an ebb throughout the region
today, but consciousness about threats to the environment and public
health is widespread and can be translated into a new round of
activism if the right circumstances come together.
Environmental Protests in China
The environmental movement
in China exhibits many of the
same dynamics observed in the
NICs and Southeast Asia. The
environmental crisis in China
is very serious. For example, the ground water table of the North
China plain is dropping by 1.5 meters (5 feet) per year. This
region produces 40 percent of China's grain. As environmentalist
Dale Wen remarks, “One
cannot help wonder about how
China will be fed once the
ground aquifer is depleted.”6 Water
pollution and water scarcity;
soil pollution, soil degradation and desertification; global
warming and the coming energy crisis—these
are all byproducts of China’s high-speed industrialization
and massively expanded consumption.
Most of the environmental destabilization in China is produced
by local enterprises and massive
state projects such as the Three Gorges Dams, but the contribution
of foreign investors is not insignificant. Taking advantage of
very lax implementation of environmental laws in China, many western
TNCs have relocated their most polluting factories into the country
and have exacerbated or even created many environmental problems.
Wen notes that the Pearl River Delta and Yangtze River Delta, the
two Special Economic Zones where most TNC subsidiaries are located,
are the most seriously affected by heavy metal and POPs (persistent
organic pollutants) pollution.7
Global warming is not a distant threat. The first comprehensive
study of the impact of the
sea level rise of global warming
by Gordon McGranahan, Deborah Balk, and Bridget Anderson puts China
as the country in Asia most threatened by the sea level rise of
up to 10 meters over the next century.8 144
million of China’s
population live in low-elevation
coastal zones, and this figure
is likely to increase owing to the export-oriented industrialization
strategies pursued by the government, which has involved the creation
of numerous special economic zones. “From
an environmental perspective,” the study warns, “there
is a double disadvantage to
excessive (and potentially rapid) coastal development. First, uncontrolled
coastal development is likely to damage sensitive and important
ecosystems and other resources. Second, coastal settlement, particularly
in the lowlands, is likely to expose residents to seaward hazards
such as sea level rise and tropical storms, both of which are likely
to become more serious with climate change.”9 The
recent spate of super-typhoons
descending on the Asian mainland
from the Western Pacific underlines the gravity of this observation.
In terms of public health, the rural health infrastructure has
practically collapsed, according
to Dale Wen. The system has
been privatized with the introduction of a “fee for service” system
that is one component of the
neoliberal reform program.
One result is the resurgence of diseases that had been brought
under control, like tuberculosis and schistosomiasis. Cuba, in
contrast, has won plaudits for its rural health care system, which
is ironic, says Wen, given that the Cuban system was based on the
Maoist era’s “barefoot
doctor” system.10
Another big public health issue has been food safety. The combination
of the industrialization of food production and the lengthening
of the food chain from production to consumption is strongly suspected
to be the cause of bird flu, which has migrated from China to other
countries. The government has become an unreliable actor in dealing
with new diseases such as bird flu and SARS, prone as it is to
engage in minimizing the threat if not promoting a cover-up, as
it did in the case of SARS.
As in Taiwan and Korea 15 years earlier, we see unrestrained export-oriented
industrialization bringing
together low-wage migrant labor,
farming communities whose lands are being grabbed or ruined environmentally,
environmentalists, and the proponents of a major change in political
economy called the “New Left.” Environment-related
riots, protests and disputes
in China increased by 30% in
2005 to more than 50,000, as pollution-related unrest has become “a
contagious source of instability
in the country,” as one
report put it. Indeed, a great
many of recorded protests fused
environmental, land-loss, income, and political issues. From 8700
in 1995, what the Ministry of Public Security calls "mass
group incidents" have grown to 87,000 in 2005, most of them
in the countryside. Moreover,
the incidents are growing in
average size from 10 or fewer persons in the mid-1990s to 52 people
per incident in 2004.11 Notable were the April 2005 riots in Huashui,
where an estimated 10,000 police officers clashed with desperate
villagers who succeeded in repelling strong vested interests polluting
their lands.
As in Taiwan, people have discovered the effectiveness of direct
action in rural China. "Without the riot, nothing would have
changed," said Wang Xiaofang, a 43-year-old farmer. "People
here finally reached their
breaking point."12 As in Southeast
Asia, struggles around the
environment and public health
may be leading to a more comprehensive political consciousness.
The strength of China’s environmental movement must not
be exaggerated. Indeed, its failures often outnumber its successes.
Alliances are often spontaneous and do not go beyond the local
level. What Dale Wen calls a national “red green” coalition
for change remains a potential force, one that is waiting to be
constructed. Nevertheless, the environmental movement is no longer
a marginal actor and it is definitely something that the state
and big capital have to deal with. Indeed, the ferment in the countryside
is a key factor that is said to have made the current Chinese leadership
to be more open to suggestions from the so-called “New Left” for
a change of course in economic policy from rapid export-oriented
growth to a more sustainable and slower domestic-demand led growth.
The Environmental Movement in India
As in China, the environment
and public health have been
sites of struggle in India. Over the last 25 years, the movement
for the environment and public health has exploded in that country.
Indeed, one can say that this movement has become one of the forces
that is deepening Indian democracy. Also, many of the leaders of
environmental struggles in India have also become key figures in
the international movements for the environment and public health.
Environmental and public health struggles go way back, but perhaps
the single biggest event that
propelled the movement to becoming
a critical mass was the Bhopal gas leakage on December 3, 1984,
which released 40 tons of methyl isocynate, killing 3000 people
outright and ultimately causing 15,000 to 20,000 deaths.13 The
struggle for just compensation for the Bhopal victims continues
till this day.
There is today a proliferation of struggles in this vast country.
There is the national campaign against Coca Cola and Pepsi Cola
plants for drawing ground water
and contaminating fields with sludge. There are local struggles
against intensive aquaculture farms in Tamil Nadu, Orissa, and
other coastal states. There is a non-violent but determined campaign
by farmers against GMO’s, which has
involved the uprooting and burning of fields planted to genetically
engineered rice.
In public health, the key issue has been the tremendous pressure
from foreign pharmaceutical companies to get India to adopt patent
legislation that would be consistent with the WTO’s Trade
Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPs). The great
fear is that this would affect the ability of the country’s
pharmaceutical industry to produce cheap generic drugs for both
the home market and for export. With between 2 million and 3.6
million people living with HIV—putting India behind South
Africa and Nigeria in numbers living with HIV—and with so
many African countries with large HIV-infected populations depending
on cheap Indian drug imports, to comply or not to comply with TRIPs
has become a life-and-death issue.
Two years ago, key amendments pushed by progressive forces were
incorporated into the Indian
Patents Act, resulting in what
one influential journal described
as “a relatively loose
patents regime for now.”14 One
key amendment was that Indian
companies could continue to produce and market drugs they were
producing before January 1, 2005, after
paying a “reasonable royalty” to
the patent holder. They were
banned from doing this under
the previous patent regime.
Another important amendment
made the process of exporting drugs to another country less cumbersome
by eliminating the need for a compulsory license from that country.15 These may seem to be minor gains, but in the byzantine world of
TRIPs, the devil is in the detail.
It would be worthwhile, at this point, to look closely at what
has become the most influential of India’s mass-based environmental
movement: the anti-dam movement.
Dams often represented the modernist vision that guided many Third
World governments in their struggle to catch up with the West in
the post-War period. The technological blueprint for power development
for the post-World War II period was that of creating a limited
number of power generators--giant dams, coal or oil-powered plants,
or nuclear plants--at strategic points which would generate electricity
that would be distributed to every nook and cranny of the country.
Traditional or local sources of power that allowed some degree
of self-sufficiency were considered backward. If you were not hooked
up to a central grid, you were backward.
Centralized electrification with its big dams, big coal-fired
plants, and nuclear plants
became the rage. Indeed, there
was an almost religious fervor about this vision among leaders
and technocrats who defined their life's work as "missionary
electrification" or
the connection of the most
distant village to the central
grid. Jawaharlal Nehru, the dominant figure in post-World War II
India, called dams the"temples
of modern India," a statement
that, as Indian author Arundhati
Roy points out, made its way
into primary school textbooks in every Indian language. Big dams
have become an article of faith inextricably linked with nationalism. “To
question their utility amounts
almost to sedition."16
In any event, in the name of missionary electrification, India's
technocrats, Roy observes in
her brilliant essay, The Cost
of Living,
not only built "new dams and irrigation schemes...[but also]
took control of small, traditional
water-harvesting systems that
had been managed for thousands of years and allowed them to atrophy."17 Here Roy expresses an essential
truth: that centralized electrification
preempted the development of alternative power-systems that could
have been more decentralized, more people-oriented, more environmentally
benign, and less capital intensive.
The key forces behind central electrification were powerful local
coalitions of power technocrats, big business, and urban-industrial
elites. Despite the rhetoric about "rural electrification," centralized
electrification was essentially biased toward the city and industry.
Essentially, especially in the case of dams, it involved expending
the natural capital of the countryside and the forests to subsidize
the growth urban-based industry. Industry was the future. Industry
was what really added value. Industry was synonymous with national
power. Agriculture was the past.
While these interests benefited, others paid the costs. Specifically,
it was the rural areas and the environment that absorbed the costs
of centralized electrification. Tremendous crimes have been committed
in the name of power generation and irrigation, says Roy, but these
were hidden because governments never recorded these costs. In
India, Roy calculates that large dams have displaced about 33 million
people in the last 50 years, about 60 per cent of them being either
untouchables or indigenous peoples
India, in fact, does not have a national resettlement policy for
those displaced by dams. The
costs to the environment have
been tremendous. Roy points out that "the
evidence against Big Dams is
mounting alarmingly--irrigation disasters, dam-induced floods,
the fact that there are more drought prone and flood prone areas
today than there were in 1947. The fact is that not a single river
in the plains has potable water."18
Things changed when the government announced its plans to dam
the mighty Narmada River in
the late seventies. Instead
of quietly accepting the World Bank-backed enterprise, the affected
people mounted a resistance that continues to this day. The Narmada
Bachao Andolan movement led by Medha Patkar at the Sardar Sarovar
Dam and Alok Aggarwal and Silvi at the Maheshwar Dam drew support
from all over India and internationally. The resistance of the
people, most of them adivasis or indigenous people,
succeeded in getting the World
Bank to stop funding the project and saddling it with delays, making
the completion of the dam uncertain. The Supreme Court, for instance,
ordered rehabilitation for all those affected by the Sardar Sarovar
Dam's construction, and in March 2005 ruled to halt construction
on the dam until this had happened. Construction of the dam has
now been halted at 110.6 meters, a figure that is much higher than
the 88 metres proposed by the activists, and lower than the 130
meters that the dam is eventually supposed to reach. It is unclear
at this point what the final outcome of the project will be or
when it will be completed, though the entire project is meant to
be finished by 2025.19 The fate of the Maheshwar Dam is similarly
unclear.
Equally important was the broader political impact of the Narmada
struggle. It proved to be
the cutting edge of the social
movements that have deepened India’s
democracy and transformed the
political scene. The state bureaucracy and political parties must
now listen to these movements or risk opposition or, in the case
of parties, being thrown out of power. Social movements in the
rural areas played a key role in stirring up the mass consciousness
that led to the defeat in 2004 of the neoliberal coalition led
by the Hindu chauvinist BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) that had campaigned
on the pro-globalization slogan “India
Shining.” While
its successor, the Congress
Party-led coalition, has turned
its back on the rural protest that led to its election and followed
the same anti-agriculture and pro-globalization policies of the
BJP, it risks provoking an even greater backlash in the near future.
The environmental movement faces its biggest challenge today:
global warming. As in China,
the threat is not distant either
in space or in time. The Mumbai
deluge of 2005 came at a year
of excessive rainfall that
would normally occur once in
a hundred years.20 The
Himalayan glaciers have been
retreating, with one of the
largest of them, Gangotri,
receding at what one journal
described as “an
alarming rate, influencing
the stream run-off of Himalayan
rivers.”21 Six
per cent, or 63.2 million,
of India’s population live in
low elevation coastal zones
that are vulnerable to sea-level
rise. On the Gujarat coast,
sea level rise22 is displacing
villages, as it is many more
places along India’s 7,500 km-long
coastline. One report claims
that in the “Sunderbans, two
islands have already vanished
from the map, displacing 7000
people. Twelve more islands
are likely to go under owing
to an annual 3.14 sea level rise, which
will make 70,000 refugees.
Five villages in Orissa’s
Bhitarkanika National Park,
famous for the mass nesting
of Olive Ridley turtles, have
been submerged, and 18 others
are likely to go under.”23
As in China, the challenge lies in building up a mass movement
that might be unpopular not only with the elite but also with sections
of the urban-based middle class sectors that have been the main
beneficiaries of the high-growth economic strategy that has been
pursued since the early 1990’s.
National Elites and Third Worldism
The reason for tracing the
evolution of a mass-based environmental
movement in East Asia and India is to counter the image that the
Asian masses are inert elements that uncritically accept the environmentally
damaging high-growth export-oriented industrialization models promoted
by their governing elites. It is increasingly clear to ordinary
people throughout Asia that the model has wrecked agriculture,
widened income inequalities, led to increased poverty after the
Asian financial crises, and wreaked environmental damage everywhere.
It is the national elites that spout the ultra-Third Worldist
line that the South has yet to fulfill its quota of polluting the
world while North has exceeded its quota. It is they who call for
an exemption of the big rapidly industrializing countries from
mandatory limits on the emission of greenhouse gases under a new
Kyoto Protocol. When the Bush administration says it will not respect
the Kyoto Protocol because it does not bind China and India, and
the Chinese and Indian governments say they will not tolerate curbs
on their greenhouse gas emissions because the US has not ratified
Kyoto, they are in fact playing out an unholy alliance to allow
their economic elites to continue to evade their environmental
responsibilities and free-ride on the rest of the world.
This alliance has now become formalized in the so-called “Asia
Pacific Partnership” created last year by the US, China,
India, Japan, Korea, and the United States as a rival to the United
Nations-negotiated Kyoto Protocol. Having recently recruited Canada,
which is now led by Bush clone Stephen Harper, this grouping seeks
voluntary, as opposed mandatory curbs on greenhouse gas emissions.
This is a dangerous band of states whose agenda is nothing else
than to spew carbon as they damn well please, which is what voluntary
targets are all about.
The Need for Global Adjustment
There is no doubt that the burden
of adjustment to global warming
will fall on the North, and that this adjustment will have to be
made in the next 10 to 15 years, and that the adjustment needed
might need to be much greater than the 50 per cent reduction from
the 1990’s level by 2050 that
is being promoted by the G
8. In the eyes of some experts, what might be required is in the
order of 100 or 150 per cent reduction from 1990 levels. However,
the South will also have to adjust, proportionately less than the
North but also rather stringently.
The South’s adjustment will not take place without the North
taking the lead. But it will also not take place unless its leaders
junk the export-oriented, high-growth paradigm promoted by the
World Bank and most economists to which its elites and many middle
strata are addicted.
People in the South are open to an alternative to a model of growth
that has failed both the environment
and society. For instance,
in Thailand, a country devastated by the Asian financial crisis
and wracked by environmental problems, globalization and export-oriented
growth are now bad words. To the consternation of the Economist,
Thais are more and more receptive
to the idea of a “sufficiency
economy” promoted by popular monarch King Bhumibol, which
is an inward-looking strategy
that stresses self-reliance
at the grassroots and the creation of stronger ties among domestic
economic networks, along with “moderately
working with nature.”24
Thailand may be an exception in terms of the leadership role for
a more sustainable path played by an elite, and even there the
commitment of that elite to an alternative path is questioned by
many. What is clear is that in most other places in the South,
one cannot depend on the elites and some sections of the middle
class to decisively change course. At best, they will procrastinate.
The fight against global warming will need to be propelled mainly
by an alliance between progressive civil society in the North and
mass-based citizens’ movements in the South.
As in North, the environmental movements in the South have seen
their ebbs and flows. It appears that, as with all social movements,
it takes a particular conjunction of circumstances to bring an
environmental movement to life after being quiescent for some time
or to transform diverse local struggles into one nationwide movement.
The challenge facing activists in the global North and the global
South is to discover or bring about those circumstances that will
trigger the formation of a global mass movement that will decisively
confront the most crucial challenge of our times.
1 Mohamad Mahathir, Speech
at United Nations Conference
on Environment and
Development, Rio de
Janeiro, June 13, 1992.
2 The environmental crisis
in Korea is treated at
length in Walden Bello
and Stephanie Rosenfeld,
Dragons in Distress:
Asia’s Miracle
Economies in Crisis (San
Francisco: Food First,
1990), pp. 95-118.
3 See
ibid., p. 195-214.
4 Ibid,
p. 213.
5 Frieda
Sinanu, “Coming
of Age: Indonesia’s
Environmental Network
Faces Dilemmas as it
Turns 25,” Inside
Indonesia, 2007.
6 Interview
with Dale Wen,
Focus
on the Global South website.
7 Ibid.
8 Cited
in R. Ramachandran, “Coming
Storms,” Frontline,
Vol. 24, No. 7 (April
7 - 20, 2007).
9 Quoted in ibid.
10 Email
communication, Sept.
25, 2007.
11 Fred
Bergsten et al., China:
What the World Needs
to Know now about the
Emerging Superpower (Washington:
Center for Strategic
and International Studies
and Institute for International
Economics, 2006), pp.
40-41.
12 “Increase
in Environmental Unrest
Causes Instability in
China,” Green
Clippings.
13 “Bhopal
Disaster,” Wikipedia.
14 V.
Sridhar Siddharth Narrain, “A
Tempered Patents Regime,” Frontline,
Vol. 22, No. 8 (2005).
15 Ibid.
16 Arundhati
Roy,
The Cost of Living (London:
Flamingo, 1999).
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 “Narmada
River,” Wikipedia.
20 R.
Ramachandran, “Himalayan
Concerns,” Frontline,
Vol. 24, No. 4 (2007).
21 Ibid.
22 R.
Ramachandran, “Coming
Storms…”.
23 Dionne
Busha, “Gone
with the Waves,” Frontline,
Vol. 24, No. 14 (2007).
24 Thailand Human Development
Report 2007: Sufficiency
Economy and Human Development (Bangkok: United Nations
Development Program,
2007), pp. 48-49. |